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Abstract 
 
The present paper addresses the question how ethnocentrism operates on the local level in 
two distinct European border cities, how representations of the ‘Other’ are formed and 
transformed, and how they structure perceptions of the Self and of everyday life. More 
specifically, the author investigates in how far we can speak of a continuity or discontinuity 
of historical prejudice regarding Poles and Moroccans respectively, from the times of nation-
building in Germany and Spain to the present. Adopting a historical and comparative 
perspective, the paper sets out to understand the absence of reference made to German-Polish 
and Spanish-Moroccan history in focus groups with high school students. To this end, the 
concept of collective memory (historical memory or memory politics) is recurred to. The 
author argues that only if being ‘not Polish’ is part of the German and ‘being not Moroccan’ 
part of the Spanish Self-definition, we can understand that historical prejudice is absorbed by 
the students through their mere ‘being there’ in everyday life in their particular home 
countries and cities. In order to sustain this hypothesis, the paper traces how both Germany 
and Spain have been able to constitute themselves as nation-states only after having subjected 
their respective neighbours to the East and South to significant territorial loss and public 
defamation.  
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Introduction 
In the age of globalisation and the emergence of new post-national forms of 
identification, in the age of European Enlargement to the East and the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership to the South, we are led to believe that political borders – be they European or 
national - are losing their traditional importance. At the same time, the rise of xenophobia, 
ethno-nationalism and right-wing extremism all over Europe has shaken the foundations of 
post-Cold War European society. By studying, in a comparative perspective, how 
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ethnocentrism operates on the local level in two distinct European border cities, how 
representations of the ‘Other’ are formed and transformed, and how they structure 
perceptions of the Self and of everyday life, we hope to shed some light upon the “open 
borders – closed minds” paradox.  
More specifically, we propose to shift the focus of ethnocentrism away from ‘their 
differences’ (race, culture, etc.) towards ‘our representations and remembering’ of these 
differences (or, indeed, similarities). In 16 unstructured Focus Group discussions 1 with 
adolescents in two European border cities, Algeciras in Southern Spain and Frankfurt/Oder 
in Eastern Germany, contemporary representations of their neighbours, Poles and 
Moroccans respectively, have been elicited. Border cities have been selected because of their 
‘gate function’ between two worlds where the salience of the Other is high (i.e. adolescents 
are constantly confronted with their neighbours and do hold a representation).2 Adolescents 
have been chosen because with them, the reproduction of markers of difference such as 
culture, gender, class3 and Other-orientation4 are still somewhat ‘in the making’ (i.e. can be 
traced in discussion) and because the ‘guinea pig halo’ effect (answering in terms of social 
desirability) can be expected to be lower than with adults. In order to trace at least partly 
where the students’ ideas come from, four adult focus groups (with the students’ teachers 
and parents, one each per country) have also been carried out. 
While the student Focus Groups generated very rich material indeed, one theme was 
surprisingly absent: the past. When contrasted with the adult focus groups, in part 2 of this 
paper, it becomes apparent that the students might not ‘know’ certain things relating to the 
complex histories of their countries, but they still represent the neighbours essentially in the 
same terms as their parents and teachers. How is this possible? Part 3 therefore sets out to 
identify an overarching historical representation5 of the Pole in Germany and of the 
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Moroccan in Spain that is even more general than collective memory derived in a bottom-up 
way. It is, I shall argue, part of the German and Spanish national identity itself.   
 
At the Gates of ‘Fortress Europe’ 
 The two borderlands we are dealing with differ greatly with regards to their economic 
and political context, the legal provisions made for border crossing, immigration and 
naturalisation (see ANNEX 2), and with regards to the specific border culture that have 
flourished in the two settings. Broadly speaking – based on Martínez (Martínez 94)6 
classificatory scheme of borderlands – we might say that Frankfurt (O.) is moving from a 
coexistent to an interdependent border. Here, tensions between neighbouring states have 
been reduced after the fall of socialism in the German Democratic Republic and the People’s 
Republic of Poland (e.g. official recognition of Oder-Neisse border in 1990, Treaty of Good 
Neighbourhood in 1991) and some binational policies of interstate, interregional or local 
cooperation are put into place (featuring Interreg, local cross-border initiatives, Slubfurt e.V., 
Europaregion Viadrina, Slubfurt Bus, etc.) allowing for modest cross-border interaction 
between the populations. Algeciras on the other hand is a typical case of an alienated 
border, aggravated by the fact that 14 km of sea divide it from Tanger on the other shore of 
the Mediterranean. Here, many tensions and animosities exist on the state- level (territorial 
conflict about the enclaves (Ceuta, Melilla), the Sahara and fisheries in the Strait of Gibraltar; 
‘symbolic’ occupations of the unpopulated islands such as Perejil/Leila); cross-border 
interaction between populations is almost inexistent due to prejudice on both sides and due to 
administrative boundaries for Moroccans.  
 With a view to historical and contemporary prejudice, the borderlands also differ 
greatly in two more ways, i.e. regarding the volume and relevance of immigration in the 
border cities studied and regarding the bases made to account for prejudice. As far as 
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immigration is concerned, both the Eastern German Länder7 and Spain8 have a similar 
foreigner-to-citizen ratio of about 1.5 to 2%. In Eastern Germany, many of these foreigners 
are ethnic Germans from Eastern and Central Europe and the ex-SU [Aussiedler], who in the 
1980s and early 1990s acted upon a former constitutional right to live as “Germans among 
Germans”, by now abolished by the Law for Settling the Consequence of War 
[Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz] in 1992/39. As a significant number of Aussiedler were 
Polish citizens, representations of ‘Poles’ in Germany often still include these ethnic 
Germans, but less so in the immediate border area than in inland Germany. In comparison 
with Eastern Germany, the salience of the 2% of foreigners is arguably higher in Spain as the 
country has moved from its previous long-term of role a labour-exporting to being a labour-
importing country in just one decade (mid-1980s to mid-1990s). Moroccans are the largest 
sending-country, they are particularly visible in Algeciras and neighbouring Tarifa where 
small boats with illegal immigrants arrive almost on a daily basis. Adding to this the 
differences in type of borderlands discussed above, we can say that representations of 
Moroccans in Algeciras are mainly representations of immigrants whereas in Frankfurt/O., 
representations of Poles are mainly representations of neighbours although neither is a pure 
case.  
 The grounds for prejudice in the two settings also differ greatly. At present, I would 
argue, the dominant factor is economic threat in Frankfurt and cultural threat in 
Algeciras. Let us develop this latter point a bit further. With regards to the literature on the 
German-Polish borderland one often encounters statements such as the following: 
 
“The Oder and  Neisse Rivers, which form the boundary between Germany and Poland, have 
been called ‘the Rio Grande of Europe’ [on the basis of] the ‘strong economic and social 
parallels’ between the U.S.-Mexico and German-Polish relationships. In few other geographic 
locations do poor and rich countries so immediately meet” (Andreas 2001). 
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The Rio Grande analogy as a shortcut to explain economic disparities at the Oder-
Neisse border - a creation of the victorious allies from WWII - seems somewhat far- fetched if 
put into historical perspective: Had not both the German Democratic Republic and the 
People’s Republic of Poland been labelled ‘Second World’ just over a decade ago? However, 
it is true that already during the 40 years that the GDR and the PRP lived side by side as 
socialist ‘brother’ countries the ‘income and supply cleavage’ [Einkommens-und 
Versorgungsgefälle] between the two was a seedbed for stereotypes in Frankfurt, e.g. that of 
the ‘sell-out’ of the GDR by Polish citizens (Ziemer 99). Since German Unification in 1990, 
living standards between Germans and Poles have further diverged by any measure10; the 
students’ representations of their ne ighbouring country provide evidence for the translation of 
this fact into stereotypes based of collective memory of the GDR years. Whether a feeling of 
civilisatory superiority (deutsche Tugenden, work ethic, etc.), a theme found in the literature 
yet not strongly present in my focus groups, is a consequence of perceived economic 
superiority (Kosmala 2001, 2:29-33) remains to be discussed. In the case of the Oder-Neisse 
border, there is serious hope for a re-evaluation of stereotypes in the decades following the 
Eastward Enlargement of the European Union in May 2004 that bears a promise for reduction 
of regional disparities. 
In contrast, the Spanish-Moroccan border at the Strait of Gibraltar is sometimes 
described as  
 
 “the invisible rampart of fortress Europe where the European continent and the ‘Third World’ 
of Africa draw close and almost touch each other” (King and Rodríguez-Melguizo 99).  
 
 
Although the Strait of Gibraltar, finis terrae, has marked the southernmost border11 of 
the Spanish Kingdom since 1492, Spain’s accession to the European Union (1986) has 
significantly changed its nature. According to López García “it was entry into the European 
Community and the dynamic of economic approximation … that has attracted an immigrant 
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population [to Spain] and with it produced a new ‘return of the moro’ - the reinvention by our 
public opinion of the idea of the ‘insecurity of the Southern border’(López García 93a). In the 
past years, the Strait of Gibraltar has indeed been fortified as one of the bulwarks of Europe’s 
new external border: Visa regulations were imposed for Moroccan travellers. Border controls 
have toughened. A pilot project is in place to assure the ‘early detection’ of illegal boats 
arriving at the Moroccan shores. Until 2006, 140 Million Euros (for all external borders taken 
together) are invested into better border control, the establishment and training of a common 
European border guard, standardisation of national procedures regarding illegal immigrants 
and the establishment of a European agency co-ordinating border protection.  
 However, it is a matter of debate whether – as López García claims – anti-Moroccan 
prejudice really was dormant before 1986. Other commentators would argue that the 
geographical vicinity and century-old transit of peoples and cultures, languages and beliefs 
have never been met by an affective closeness between the peoples of the Iberian Peninsula 
and Morocco. However, all these factors made that North Africa could not easily be ignored 
and has lived on in Spanish mythology for over 1000 years, mainly in form of the antagonism 
between Moor or ‘moro’12 vs. Christian. 
“Feared, envied, combated, insulted; the Muslim – Mohammedan convert to Catholicism, 
Turk or Moroccan – has nourished legends and fantasies, motivated songs and poems, been 
the main character of dramas and novels, and powerfully stimulated the mechanisms of our 
imagination for ten centuries” (Goytisolo 89).13  
 
In how far then can we say that the adolescents’ representations of their neighbours, 
Poles and Moroccans, are based on remembrance of things past? Do the student’s base their 
argumentation, for example, on the sell-out of East German goods to Polish citizens in 
Frankfurt/Oder or on the religious cleavage between Muslims and Christians in Algeciras? 
Before looking into some passages from the focus group discussions, let us briefly set out the 
theoretical tools available to tackle such a question.  
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Remembering the Other – Historical and Contemporary Representations of the 
Neighbouring Other 
On the basis of the classical works by Maurice Halbwachs 14 (Halbwachs 25) and 
Fredrick Bartlett15 (Bartlett 32) that bring together psychological and sociological 
conceptions of collective memory, as well as drawing on Michael Billig16 (Billig 95), I 
suggest to investigate the above questions within the framework of the concept ‘collective 
memory’. Collective memory is situated on the crossroads between individual and 
collective and between past and present or context. It is individual because at least three of 
the ‘four moments’ of recollection taken place within the information-processing system of 
the individual: registration, conservation and recall. 17 However, remembering an event and 
localising it in the past is also mediated by subjectivity (there are individual differences in 
what people remember; Bergson) and by social interaction, identity and influence (social 
context and encounters bring memories to the fore; Halbwachs).18 Second, collective 
memory is the interaction between memory politics (the rendering common [‘flagging’] of 
historical memory; cf. Billig 1995) and recollections of what has been personally 
experienced, embedded into the demands of the situation (common memory; cf. Bartlett 
1932). The functioning of collective memory is thus a two-way-process: Certain memories 
are imposed upon the students by the media, parents, peers, the national education system, 
etc. (top-down) or simply ‘flagged’ (rendered salient) in everyday life. Others develop in a 
bottom-up way from what the adolescents themselves have experienced and ‘handed down’ 
(note that the mechanisms by which the multiplicity of experiences and recollections come 
together in the unity of a ‘collective’ memory – another great paradox - cannot be treated 
here).  
It is the second dualism, historical memory vs. common memory, that we shall turn to 
in the remainder of this paper. By looking at a particular instance of each of them (common 
 9 
memory: representations of Poles and Moroccans by German and Spanish students 
respectively and by their parents and teachers; historical memory: Self- image of the nation 
portrayed in German and Spanish historiography vis- à-vis popular sayings and verbal images 
of the Other), we hope to understand in how far contemporary and historical images are 
continuous or discontinuous and to thereby shed some light upon the historical element in the 
“open borders – closed minds” paradox. 
 
Common Memory: How the Other is Experienced, how Experience is Passed On  
When carrying out a thematic analysis of the topics dealt with in the student focus 
groups19, it was rather shocking to have to juxtapose the students’ widespread anti-Polish / 
anti-Moroccan sentiment with their almost absolute ignorance of the tragedies of 
medieval and modern German-Polish and Spanish-Moroccan history. Although the 
interview style did not allow for direct questioning on the topic (unstructured or informant-
driven interviewing, not a ‘test’ of any type of knowledge but an opportunity to talk about 
one’s experiences), we had expected students to refer to a past before their life-times in order 
to substantiate or qualify their claims. This was not the case, representations of the Other 
were – and this is yet another proof for the pertinence of Halbwachs’ work – driven by 
present identities and, in our particular case, by the demands of youth culture (consumerism, 
sexuality, etc.).    
Frankfurt/Oder: 
In Frankfurt, with the exception of two children who have relatives in or from 
Poland20, no references to history were made in any of the student focus groups. In contrast to 
the Algecireños, the German adolescents reported a rather patchy image of the Poles, 
expressing their being uncomfortable with them but generally staying clear of stark 
xenophobic judgements, as the following example shows:   
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Sequence 1 – Germany: D5-M10 
M10: […] No, well … somehow I have a bad image of them cause, well when all you meet is 
such people who, don’t know, always, don’t know, pull a strange cart around or don’t know, 
sell some random cigarettes. That is somehow no image for a country like that, somehow. 
That’s why one has this bizarre bad impression, somehow. – Well, don’t know, somehow … 
I’ve heart that Slubice, that’s the only really dumb part, well don’t know, elsewhere in Poland, 
well, so behind, it’s supposed to be quite o.k., somehow. 
T: And have you gone there? 
M10: No, no. But I’ve heart stuff about it. Well, don’t know … 
 
The adolescents are clearly aware of the social undesirability of ‘being prejudiced’ 
against their neighbours from Poland, certainly because of historical memory and rather 
visible co-operation between Frankfurt and Slubice. When it comes to general characteristics 
or evaluations of behaviour, they wrap up their ideas of Poles in anecdotes or differentiate 
between different types of Poles (e.g. the bad ones at the border and the good ones in inland 
Poland) rather than making sweeping general statements. In relation to appearances, some of 
the students do however make precisely such statements:  
Sequence 2 – Germany: D8-l.450  
“F49: […] Poles run around, don’t know, so dirty. So sort of, sort of, as I said, sort of not 
wearing modern things, or like we do, here, sort of thing. […] 
F31: Oh no, and when the women go to town … 
F49: Yes! 
F31: … then they are always totally dressed up, ya, well, then they act as if … like ‘have a 
look at me! I’m chique! And then they always look like dressed up scum, somehow. 
F49: Mh. 
F31: Like tried very hard, but didn’t work anyway.” 
 
The favourite themes, coming up in all groups, are, first of all, the Poles’ alleged 
shopping habits, stocking goods en masse that is contrasted with how ‘we’ ‘normally’ do 
things:  
Sequence 3 - Germany: D2, l. 337-345 
“F2: [They buy] always entire boxes full, I find, entire palettes … 
M2: Well, when they go shopping, they shop for real. Really, that’s, behind it’s totally, it’s … 
the rear of the car looks like … 
F2: They cannot even see through the rear window. It’s so massively packed, it looks as 
though … to get. Really horrid [schlimm]. – Well, I live down there, there is an Aldi [discount 
supermarket] there, and all you see are black number plates [i.e. from Poland]. 
M2: Well ya.“ 
  
Sequence 4 – Germany: D2. l.720  
“M2: […] Normally, you buy many different things in small amounts. Poles … have, ehem, 
few things they buy, but … well, few different things, but … 
F2: In huge amounts! 
M2: In huge amounts. […]” 
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Secondly, their supposed criminality, selling stolen cigarettes in the streets of Frankfurt and 
stealing “everything possible” [D5-M30: “Well, it is pretty much like that … they steal 
everything possible”. / Na, eigentlich is dat so, dat die allet mögliche klauen. ... ] or 
“everything that could bring money” [D5-M10: “… allet wat so ... ick würd sagen, Geld 
bringen könnte”] from cars and bikes to clothes or food in Frankfurt’s shops all the way to 
bulky garbage that is subsequently done up and resold. “Well, because they sell it. Because 
they don’t have money themselves and so they get the stuff here and then they re-sell it like 
that”. This latter aspect, interpreted by some as theft [“You cannot just let this happen. You 
cannot just let them steal like that!” (D8-F31)], points to a representation of Poles as poor and 
hence having low standards (they “don’t have a choice”, it is “horrid” [“schlimm”] that “they 
have to go so far” as to collect other people’s garbage; D4-F8) yet maybe also clever 
survivors (they then “resell it over there”; D4-M14). 
     
Sequence 5 – Germany: D8-F31-l.550  
“F31: Cause, I mean, for them maybe it still is good stuff. … cause such an old bike which, on 
which we wouldn’t sit down anymore, might still have something to it for them, sort of thing. 
[…] they are happy with less than we are: With less and less cool things, and for us everything 
has to be better and more amazing (toller).” 
 
It seems that the heart of the students’ anti-Polish prejudice is a feeling of economic 
superiority. When Poles dress up they still look like made up scum [feingemachte Asis] as 
some more radical students claim, they shop en gros in cheap supermarkets as poor people 
do, they even recycle ‘our’ old bulky garbage (but German garbage is not meant for Poles!). 
This feeling is coupled with threat of deprivation; according to the adolescents, Poles pose a 
threat to labour markets (Poles take away ‘our’ jobs, and we already live in the worst part of 
Germany) and to security (they steal, they are constantly after ‘our’ women …). The border, 
almost all agree, has a security function, it helps to maintain the status quo: With European 
Enlargement, at worst, “they will all come over …” [D8-F49]. And that - as a popular saying 
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has it – would be the end: “Then Poland would be open” (meaning total chaos) [“dann ist 
Polen offen”. In sum, the Frankfurt students use many many recollections of what has been 
experienced, either by them personally or by their friends, relatives, someone they heard 
about, etc. and embed these into the demands of the situation, e.g. to support or contradict 
someone else’s view. However, these recollections seem not to go back beyond the present 
and the recent past. Experiences dating from another context (e.g. the GDR, WWII …) are 
not reported.  
The adolescents’ parents and teachers also provide (rather more positive 21) 
representations of Poles that are strongly influenced by their personal experience, especially 
dating from the times of the German Democratic Republic (1949-1990) and the People’s 
Republic of Poland (1945-1989). Strangely enough, the German and Polish exodus from the 
Eastern provinces was discussed at large (in 1944/45, 9.5 million Germans fled the Red 
Army; until 1949, another 4.4 million Germans and 3 million Poles were displaced under the 
population exchange provision in the Potsdam Treaty) while no references were made to the 
pre-war period or to the Nazi war crimes vis- à-vis Poland. Note that the GDR did neither 
assume responsibility of the Nazi-crimes that were considered the heritage of the FRG nor 
allow public debate [Aufarbeitung] about post-war displacement that after all concerned a 
large part of the GDP population personally. According to some commentators, precisely this 
silence is at the heart of modern prejudice. “One has to … admit that, out of all peoples, 
Germans most reject the Poles. The desire to have someone as an enemy to hate might seem 
to be the ultimate remainder of the German war psychosis” (Helbig 89).22 
Vivid discussions evolved around the dictated friendship between the ‘socialist 
brother countries’ (see below), the period of open borders (1972-1980) when Germans could 
witness the relative political freedom in Poland and Polish shoppers profited from the higher 
living standards in Germany as well as the sell out [Ausverkauf] starting in the late 1980s 
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when some Polish citizens resold subsidised GDR good on the markets of West Berlin (see 
below): 
Sequence 6 - Teacher Focus Group, F1, p.5 
“When the GDR was still in place, there were so-called … well, Czech youth association, FDJ 
[Free German Youth], the youth association of the GDR, Poland-GDR,  … all sorts of things. 
And there was, well I say it outright: That was imposed. (...) The central government just fixed 
a date for a meeting, FDJ and Polish youth association … ZSNP they were called. And they 
knew, if they were with the FDJ … well, once I participated, that was here in Frankfurt, with 
people from Angermünde, another place I once worked. And everybody was shipped there, I 
put it like that, and then there was an event. And  t h e s e  young people did not go with 
enthusiasm to an event like that. That, I have to say. They are all adults now. [...] Or when you 
were in some shop, say the butcher’s, Polish citizens came and bought I don’t know 10 such 
long sausages, went to Berlin, to the market, and sold them. All these are things that get stuck. 
Well, I’ve only heard about it then, I didn’t live through that … Or: Our citizens were 
attacked, by Polish citizens, who bought dozens of shoes etc. etc. Already then it was like that. 
So, it’s not just now … cause: transformation [Wende], cause now we are … it has always 
been like that! These are people who are now adults and have kids themselves. And that, … as 
F1 says: Something gets stuck”. 
 
     
Both the students’ and the teachers’ and parents’ insistence on the theme of 
consumerism is a good example for the interplay between the bottom-up and the top-down 
aspects of collective memory. During the time of open “friendship bridges” in the 1970s, the 
East German people asked their government to stop the binge shopping [Hamsterkäufe] of 
their unloved poor neighbours whose purchasing power stunned Konsum department stores 
and citizens alike. Anti-Polish prejudice was so strong in the late 1970s that the Protestant 
Church wrote an open letter warning of xenophobic tendencies in the GDR. During the 
Solidarnosc years in the early 1980s, the SED government actively spread further anti-Polish 
propaganda taking as a starting point the old slogan of ‘polnische Wirtschaft’: Poles are lazy 
and anarchical, they strike instead of working. No wonder if they are poor (Ziemer 99). The 
focus groups mirror this theme.     
Algeciras 
In Algeciras, like in Frankfurt, the student focus groups did not bring out any 
particular remembering of past events. After probing from my side, one group had a diffuse 
exchange of ideas about the topic of al-Andalus, the Moorish Spain (711-1492), in the midst 
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of which one girl suddenly declares “this place is more theirs than ours” and no one 
disagrees.  
Sequence 7 – E4-F118-M119 
F118: Al-Andalus. That’a where the word ‘Andalucia’ comes from; when the moros were 
here. 
T: And when was that? 
F118: They left 300 years ago. 
M119: But they are coming back. 
F118: Really, this place is more theirs than ours, they got stuck here for 600 years or more but 
I don’t care.  
F115: I don’t care either. 
T: When did you say this was? 
F118: Some 300 years ago. 
F115: 300 before Christ. 
T: Why did they come? What did they do here? 
F115: They built stuff. We have ruins in the park Maria Christina, just outside.  
F118: The Mezquita of Cordoba, the Alhambra. 
F115: They built beautiful things.  
M119: But they are garbage. 
T: Those from today or from before? 
M119: All of them.  
 
 
However, the adolescents seem unable to qualify their representations of Moroccans 
in the light of this realization; the students’ conviction that moros are ‘garbage’ still stands 
out as the conclusion of this debate. Altogether, the topics discussed in relation to Moroccans 
were somewhat more diverse than those discussed in Frankfurt in relation to Poles. Not least 
so because the Spanish adolescents were actually ready to evaluate Moroccans – often in an 
outright racist fashion (“we are anti-Moro”, “they should go home” (E6-FI), they are all 
“garbage” [todo basurilla] (E4-M119)). In many Focus Groups, the students voiced a real 
threat of a Moorish conquista, of being overrun by “avalanches of moros”. 
Sequence 8 – Spain: E4.l.589-616 
“M119: [If you help the illegal immigrants when they arrive] they give you a nice little pocket 
money because they have money from dealing drugs; it is a chain until they keep Spain 
altogether. 
T: What are they going to do with Spain? 
M119: They are going to keep Spain altogether and they are going to kick us all out. Before 
that, I’ll kill them all. 
F118: And it’s not only Morocco. All the moros from all over the place join in. 
M119: I’ll put a bomb. 
M120: They have to kill me first. 
T: So Spain will be Moorish one day? 
M120: I have to be dead. 
M119: One day they’ll rise against us and they’ll want to kick us out from here and there will 
be war, but force, union makes force and we are more than they are! 
F118: But if every day another thousand moros come … 
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M120: In Ceuta, there is a neighbourhood where the kids have a scooter when they’re 8, a 
pistol when they’re 9 or 10. A month ago, a tiger escaped and ate a women, this is the 
neighbourhood where they do what they want, police don’t go there.” 
  
  Like one would expect in an immigrant-receiving society (note that the border-
relationship plays hardly any role in the students’ discourses), the students’ stories mirror 
historical memory in the form of sensationalist news reporting (“I don’t know what to say to 
you, it’s that to me Moroccans … what I don’t like is their culture, their religion, how they 
abuse their women … the headscarf school [el colegio del pañuelo] and all that!” (E7-21) and 
the occasional spooky myth about the Other (“at the bazaar downtown the moros abuse girls” 
E3-7). Overall, the interviewees go into detail (how one girls’ cousin had a baby with a 
morito dealer that later died etc. pp.), tell their own personal stories (how a girl once was 
taken for a mora in Barcelona, how moros behave like they own the place during the feria of 
Algeciras), voice sometimes crass opinions (“every time something happens, it’s the moros!” 
(E3-7)) and debate and disagree with their fellow-students. One gets the impression that the 
Algeciras students, or at least some of them, are in personal contact with Moroccans (a group 
of boys living in the same neighbourhood as Moroccan immigrant children report to be 
“friends” with them and “rely on them” (E4-M119), a group of girls admits frequenting 
‘morito’ dealers (E6-FI)). But even these groups repeat stereotypical representation of 
Moroccans: “they are good people [buena gente] but they are also lyres [mentirosos] and 
have a lot of fantasy” (E4-M119). “Here, if they don’t have work, well they start dealing as if 
they were cousins. They are all mates [colegas]“ (E4-15). Women are described alternatively 
as subdued veiled creatures [cara tapada] (e.g. E4-F115) or as “traitorous” witches. 
Sequence 9 – Spain: E4-13 
“F118: The thing is that the moras are very traitorous. 
F114: Some are, others are not.  
F118: They know a lot. They get married with an old man who is going to die. He gets her 
documents [i.e. residence permit] and since the moras know how to capture [agarrar] a guy, 
the man gets crazy about her [se encapricha], she hits him two or three times, leaves him there 
and, since she’s got her papers in place and her life sorted, she goes with another Moroccan 
and that’s it.  
F115: Some come here pregnant to give birth here. And when they have their babies, they 
have to stay cause the baby is Spanish.  
F118: They carry glass balls that curse.”   
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In sum, the students’ prejudice is structured by two themes: First, the idea of invasion 
(Algeciras will be mora, ‘they’ ask like the bosses in ‘our’ public spaces, fiestas, etc.) and 
second, drug-problem (if somebody has to get rich from dealing drugs, why not Spaniards?). 
While the first is directly related to the history of conquista and reconquista and Spain’s 
recent entry into the European Union which brought with it mass- immigration from the so-
called ‘Third World’, the second reveals aspects of a border-culture. Although the students 
seem not to know this, drug-traffic, alcohol and cigarette smuggling and other forms 
contraband activities have been known in the Campo de Gibraltar for centuries and have 
little to do with Moroccans. Indeed, most drug dealers are Ceutis holding Spanish nationality.       
With their parents, in contrast, the Christian vs. moro dualism, according to them 
above all imposed by Franco and his incompetent administration of the North Moroccan 
Protectorate, is apparent all over the focus groups. There is a tendency to use the Franco 
dictatorship as an excuse for why many people don’t know about how “enriching” the 
Christian-Jewish-Muslim cohabitation in Spain has been during the time of al-Andalus: 
Sequence 10: Focus Group Parents, Algeciras; A-E, p.23 
“A: [...] Look it’s that here, we’ve had 40 years of … of the good guys being the Catholics and 
the moros being very very very very bad. That’s to say, the reconquista , here; we have to 
understand each other, the culture that we’ve lived in and what we’ve learned, for example of 
al-Andalus, as it is understood today. And well, the the the things that the Andalucia regional 
government is proposing, that’s the discussion of al-Andalus, well that hasn’t existed four 
days ago, right? Before, nobody knew about this … they taught us the the the history of the 
Moorish invasion and that then we kicked them out, I don’t know how many centuries later 
when the Catholic kings came. And they also took the moros along just like we we we got rid 
of the Jews, isn’t it. All the Jews we kicked out, just the same [happened with the moros].    
E: We now recognise this … Arabic culture we had here, I think we even love it, because it 
was an enriching mixture, at least for for  
A: For Andalucia.”  
 
Discussion topics included the economic differentials between Spain and Morocco, 
the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, demographic disparities, the recent shift from 
emigration to immigration in Spain and the subsequent transformation of Algeciras from a 
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place only briefly ‘invaded’ by Moroccans returning home from Northern Europe, to a lieu of 
‘permanent invasion’ 23 of the Christian world by Muslims: 
Sequence 11: Teachers Focus Group, PJ, p.3 
“Before the moros only concerned us during the month of July and the month of August, when 
they invaded us. Algeciras, but now you hear, anywhere in Algeciras, now you hear “they are 
invading us”, “they become more all the time”. […] And with this gentleman, this Luis X, just 
in front of his place they put a gardaza , just to the side he’s got a mosque; and he, since he 
didn’t know what to do any longer, because he felt totally invaded, put an image of the Holy 
Heart of Jesus up on his door”. 
 
Other themes included Spain’s entry into the European Union (1986) and subsequent need to 
protect its Southern border, as well as the Spanish Protectorate in Northern Morocco (1912-
56) and subsequent de-colonisation. Overall, the adults’ focus groups are characterised by a 
will to portray Andalucia as an open-minded thoroughly European place, still haunted by 
Franco but willing to overcome the legacy.  
 
Historical Memory: German and Spanish Nation-Building to the Expense of the 
Neighbour 
How is it possible that the students make no (or hardly any) reference to the past when 
explaining why they don’t like Poles/Moroccans, yet their representations become coherent 
only when interpreted in the light of history (see for example the passages on shopping in 
Frankfurt and on invasion in Algeciras)? As regards the content of the students’ perceptions 
of their neighbouring Other, in how far does it constitute a continuation of historical 
prejudice as identified in the secondary literature?  
In what follows, we will investigate historical memory - i.e. the memory politics, the 
top-down imposition and rendering commonplace and ordinary of certain representations and 
not others – through popular sayings and images found in historiography that trickled down 
into German and Spanish visions of the national Self. Following Billig, the “ideological 
habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced … are not removed 
from everyday life, as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or 
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‘flagged’, in the lives of its citizenry” (Billig 95).  Part 2 of this paper therefore sets out to 
identify an overarching historical representation of the Pole in Germany and of the Moroccan 
in Spain starting from the coming into being of the German and Spanish nations.  
It is futile, within the limits of this paper, to try and pinpoint exactly when the German 
and Spanish nations became nations in the full-blown sense of this almost indefinable word. 
Self-portrayals (German and Spanish textbooks, governmental documents, etc.) generally 
place the German’s national awakening as one Volk right in the midst of the European age of 
the nation from the late 18th century onward but date Spanish nation-building as early as 
1469/79 (union of Castille and Aragon) and 1492 (reconquista of the last Moorish kingdom 
of Grenade). Needless to say that is remains unclear whether an idea as remote as the ‘nation’ 
(unless it meant a ‘nation of Christians’) has in any way influenced the union of Ferdinand 
and Isabel or had the slightest significance on the territorial identification of the Toledo tailor 
or the farmer from Leon at the time. Without aiming to compare in a straight- forward manner 
the way in which the Spanish and German nations were formed, let us consider the following 
hypothesis: Both Germany and Spain have been able to constitute themselves as nation-
states only after having subjected their respective neighbours to the East and South, 
Poland and Morocco, to significant territorial loss and a public defamation campaign.  
While, in both countries, the role of France has been that of an Inspiring Other 
(Triandafyllidou 2001) or at least that of a worthy equal enemy, the degradation of Poland 
and Morocco as an uncivilised negation of the national Self has been constitutive of German 
and Spanish selfhood.  
 
German Nation-Building and the Polish ‘Other’  
“Die Zivilisation hatte in den letzten Jahrhunderten ihren Ga ng von Westen nach Osten 
befolgt und so den Deutschen die Überlegenheit über die Polen, den Polen über die Russen, 
den Russen über die Tartaren verschafft“(Binder 1843-44, 1)24 
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According to some commentators, the German tale of their own ‘civilisatory 
superiority’ vis- à-vis the neighbouring Poles dates back to the end of the 12th century when 
German settlers were invited by Polish knights to cultivate the sparsely populated Silesia, 
Pomerania, Western Grand Poland and also Small Poland. The new settlements – not least 
because of the privileges they enjoyed (‘Deutsches Recht’) – soon became the most 
prosperous in Poland. Others scholars argue that the numerous conflicts between German and 
Polish kings, and between the German Knights (‘Deutscher Orden’) and the Poles were 
“motivated exclusively by political and social, not by national” considerations and that 
“transposing the worldview of the 19th and 20th century to the distinctive conditions of the 
Middle Ages” need be avoided (Wippermann 96). However, (nationalist) German and Polish 
historiography has long disputed the ‘cultural superiority’ of the German settlers and the 
mission of the German Knights25. While the ones claim that they were fulfilling a 
“civilisatory and missionary” role, the others hold that their activities were “secular-étatist 
and military-expansionist” (Dammer and Weber 99).    
This question left aside, during the 16th and 17th centuries, Poles and Germans lived 
rather peacefully side by side. In those years, the Polish Aristocratic Republic was renown for 
its libertarian and tolerant views; many of the German Jews expelled during the 14th century 
were received here (Wippermann 87:1-47). Only when Europe entered the age of absolutism 
featuring politically potent, tightly organised states, the unchallenged power of the Polish 
nobility – contrasted with the powerlessness of the peasantry – was criticised, most famously 
so in the stereotype of “die polnische Wirthschaft”. First coined in 1784 by the historian and 
savant Georg Forster, the ‘Polish economy’ originally described the state of disorganisation 
and decay regarding the Polish social constitution (Orlowski 92), as well as the poverty of the 
rural populations, the decadence of the high nobility and the political paralysis of the Polish 
king. According to Koselleck, the term ‘polnische Wirtschaft’ was already in use along the 
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Polish-German border of the time and referred to a “unorderly, unclean state of affaires, 
ineffective, wasteful behaviour” (Koselleck 79).  
When it came to the unprecedented usurpation of the Polish partitions of 1772, 1793 
and 1795, the slogan served Prussian leaders to find broad popular support for this policy that 
was officially marketed as a missionary move to alleviate the anarchical conditions and bring 
“culture” to a place ruled by disorder and “uncleanliness” (Wippermann 96).  De facto, the 
partitions eradicated Poland from the political map of Europe and brought important 
territorial and economic gains to Prussia, allowing them to become the driving force of 
German unification (1871). During the 19th and 20th century the terminology ‘polish 
economy’ developed a life of its own (Dammer and Weber 99), often being instrumentalised 
in order to degrade the Poles as a people and deprive them of the capacity to organise their 
own nation-state and keep it alive. 
According to some scholars, the November uprising of 1830/1831 (in the Russian-
occupied part of Poland), brought a change in the representations of Poles in Germany. While 
some commentators were convinced that the Poles “in their quarrelsome arrogance” [in ihrem 
streitsüchtigen Hochmute] were unable to cooperate and achieve a common aim [“The saying 
‘polish economy’ is so widespread in Silesia that no one there believed in the possibility of a 
Polish state” (Laube 75, 1)], others argue that parts of the German bourgeoisie from all parts 
of Germany were captured by a pro-Polish euphoria. 
„By the end of the 1830s, two opposing basic opinions about Poland and the Poles had formed 
in Germany that have since turned into stereotypes and, in their core, persist until today: On 
the one hand, Poland was perceived as a backward country, both in terms of its civilisation 
and in terms of its economic and social constitution. Attributes such as ‘tough’, ‘courageous’, 
even ‘heroic’ but also such as ‘undisciplined’, ‘inconsistent’ and ‘unpredictable’ have been 
ascribed to the population of Poland. As a result, Poland is taken to be unable to organise itself 
politically and economically and has therefore – somewhat inevitably – lost its statehood. … 
On the other hand, Poles are admired due to their love for freedom, their readiness to fight for 
a just cause, their courage to face up to unequal opponents, the strive of their leaders for 
progressive change, the latter resuming the objectives of the German bourgeoisie. Other 
elements of the stereotypical Pole include their linkage with the Catholic Church – evaluated 
somewhat ambivalently in mainly Protestant Germany – as well as the stereotype of the 
beautiful (female) Pole and of her patriotic worldview”26(Ziemer 99).     
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Alongside the ‘Verteutschung’ [Germanisation] policies in the new Prussian Eastern 
provinces, the stereotype of ‘German culture’27, of the “cultural-historical, mental and moral 
superiority that the educated will always reach over the non-educated” [des 
culturhistorischen, geistigen und moralischen Übergewichts, das immer der Gebildete über 
den Ungebildeten erlangt] (Heffter 1847) dominated the German discourse on the Polish 
question. The ‘German virtues’ [Deutsche Tugenden] came to be opposed directly to the 
‘polnische Wirtschaft’28; Prussia assumed the role of an educator working towards symbiosis 
between East and West. As Friedrich Wilhelm IV, king of Prussia, put it in a statement of 
06.08.1841 “The antagonism between the terms Poles and Germans [will] find its meeting 
point in the term Prussia”29. Interestingly, after German unification excluding Austria of 
1871, Prussian parliamentarians did not attempt to preserve any sign of Polishness. Indeed, 
the eradication of Poland and the myth of German cultural superiority (as opposed to 
‘polnische Wirtschaft’) were the preconditions for German national unification, feeding 
into subsequent Germanisation policies that sweept the new nation-state.30 
In opposition to ‘theories of differentials’ [Gefälle-Theorien] portraying German 
Eastward expansion as natural, Polish historiography and panslavic ideologists denounce a 
century- long “German Eastward strive” [deutscher Drang nach Osten]. This strive, they hold, 
started in the Middle Ages and reached its peak in the national-socialist search for a new “life 
space in the East” [‘Lebensraum im Osten’], the two world wars initiated by Germany, the 
invasion of Poland in 1939, and finally the war of extermination and the murderous Nazi-
occupation policies in Poland (Labuda 64:221-265).   
 
Spanish Nation-Building and the Moroccan ‘Other’ 
“Desde la invasión árabe el horizonte de la vida española está dominado ... por la 
contraposición entre el cristiano y el moro; lo ajeno es, a la vez, musulmán y extranjero. Lo 
proprio es, pues, a la vez, cristiano y español” (Manuel García Morente, citado por (Goytisolo 
89)).31  
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In the year 711 after Christ, the governor of Tanger, Tariq ibn Zyâd, set over the Strait 
of Gibraltar with his army of 7000 Islamised Berbers. Joined by Mûsa ibn Nusayr, the 
governor of Northern Africa, he conquers Toledo and lays the foundations for five centuries 
of Muslim domination of the Iberian Peninsula, lasting until the reconquista of Cordoba in 
1236; with its last rampart, the Nasrid Kingdom of Grenade survived until 1492. Until today, 
“there are moros at the coast” [haber moros en la costa] means that someone’s presence is 
disturbing and hindering. 
Modern Spanish historiography is divided into three interpretations of al-Andalus: 
One claiming that ever since Tariq set foot on Spanish soil, the “Spanish-Moroccan 
antagonism” was born (see García Morente above), one holding that the eight centuries of 
Muslim Spain need to be divided into two distinct phases, and a last interpretation arguing 
that the antagonism only began after the fall of Grenade. According to the second and most 
influential interpretation, the first of these ideal-typcial32 phases of al-Andalus (711-1091), 
the “Oriental Dream” of Córdoba (García Gómez cited by (Ridao 2000:30-31), was a 
prosperous and blossoming period characterised by conviviality. During this era, all 
Spaniards - Jews, Muslims and Christians - lived in mutual comprehension and symbiosis 
(Vives 70)33 and the philosophy and science of antiquity were transmitted to the Latin world 
paving the way for European Renaissance and Humanism. The second period (1091-1492), in 
contrast, is portrayed as decadent and tyrannical; when al-Andalus was governed by the 
almoravides and almohades in North Africa, the “true arabo-andalousian civilisation” (Ridao 
2000:30-31) disappeared. As many others, Vives argues that the spirit of cruzada [crusade] 
and the “ideal of reconquista [re-conquest] as a violent elimination of all Muslims from 
Spanish lands” developed only from the 12th century and in reaction to the “primary and 
intransigent intolerance of the almorávides” (from 1086) and the “enslaving military power of 
the almohades” (from 1146), (Vives 70).34 According to many, is telling that the cult of 
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Santiago Matamoros de Compostela [Jacob ‘Moorkiller’ of Compostela] – the “anti-
Mohammed” – was also invented during the 12th century, finding a wide resonance around 
Europe.35    
Many others however argue that until the fall of the last Muslim kingdom of Grenade, 
Muslims were regarded as friends and neighbours or at best as “dignified rivals”. “It was after 
the fall of Grenade at the end of the 15th century, that, supported by the new politics installed 
by the Catholic Kings [Isabel and Ferdinand], the collective image of the Moor as a 
traditional enemy of the Spanish people was recreated” (de Madariaga 88, 4:577??).36 
Regardless of whether anti-Moor prejudice surged in the 8th, the 12th or the 15th century, its 
peek was clearly marked by the expulsion of mudejares (Muslims remaining in Christian 
territory after 1492) and moriscos (former Muslims converted to Catholicism under the 
coercive laws of 1525) in 1609/1610 – following that of Spanish Jews and, according to some 
sources, conversos (Jews converted to Catholicism) in 1492. These policies – the culmination 
point and terrible end of reconquista - were an outcome of the Inquisition, installed 
immediately after the unification of Castille and Aragon in 1481, of the logic of cruzada 
aiming to stop the Ottoman ‘invasion’ of Europe and liberate Jerusalem from Muslim hands, 
and the imposition of religious unity in Spain under Carlos (1525).  According to López 
García, “the expulsion was a grand concession to a socia l, collective racism that aimed to 
soothe great interior crisis using scapegoats.37 For centuries, mainstream Spanish 
historiography praised the courageous hidalgos and ‘old Christians’ who recovered their 
homeland and led Spain into the siglo de oro, the Golden Age, when riches from the New 
World made of Spain a great Empire with singular literary and artistic achievements. As a 
side effect, “the long battle for ‘reconquista’ and the final episode of Moorish expulsion have 
consolidated the Spaniards’ will to wipe out any relation, any reference to Moorish culture 
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and civilisation although the richness and shine of the latter should have been met by a 
sustained interest throughout Europe”38 (Arkoun 93:13-16).  
Ever since, it has been argued, Spanish identity is inseparably linked with 
Catholicism and the superiority of ‘old Christians’ over recent converts, with the 
honour and pride of the hidalgo, the Christian knight (small nobility) who leads 
crusades against the cruel and savage Muslim empires (Dezcallar 92). The ‘moro’ of the 
Middle Ages on the other hand has become more and more associated with the Moroccan, the 
closest and most salient North African in Spain. Indeed, in modern dictionaries, ‘moro’ and 
‘North African’ are synonyms. Totally dissociated from the Spaniard (many moros of al-
Andalus were Spaniards converted to Islam), moros have lived on as the national Other in 
legends and myth.  
Tree centuries later, in relation to the Spanish-Moroccan War of 1859/6039, 
parliamentary documents witness a persistence of themes such as the “superiority” of 
Spaniards and the “inferiority” of Moroccans (A.Rios), the spiritual or “civilisatory mission” 
to be accomplished there (Maeztu), the economic interests of Spanish capital (Joaquin Costa) 
and the feeling of being threatened and need for defence (Canovas del Castillo) (Molina 
Pérez xx). In 1859 the president of the First Spanish Republic, Emilio Castelar, described the 
inhabitants of North Africa as “races weighed down by fatalism” [razas encorvadas bajo el 
fatalismo] and as a “stupid negation of man” [estúpida negación del hombre] (López García 
74). While abroad Victor Hugo, Delacroix, Washington Irving and others celebrated the 
oriental, in Spain novels such as the widely read Romancero de la Guerra de Africa hardened 
anti-moro prejudice, providing romanticised and picturesque descriptions of Moroccans 
essentially characterised by cruelty and inferiority. 
In the 20th century, the name of Morocco (wedded with the existing stereotype of 
moro) has gained connotations of bloodshed, violence and dictatorship. The only modern 
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colonial experience of Spain40, unsuccessful as it was,  “leaves in the collective subconscious 
of the Spaniard the consciousness of a vague and diffuse risk coming from the South. From 
then on, Morocco was associated in the mind of the Spaniard in the street with enemy and 
with danger that originates in North Africa, crosses the Estrecho and can get us all” 
(Dezcallar 93)41. A renewed war with Morocco (1909/10) led to social unrest (Semana 
Trágica in Barcelona of July 1909) and ultimately to the military coup of Primo de Rivera 
(1923) who could only stay in power thanks to yet another bloody Spanish-Moroccan war). 
The Franquist coup d’etat against the republic of 1936 also originated in Spanish Morocco. 
As Dezcallar puts it, throughout the centuries, Spaniards have associated the name of 
Morocco with threat and annoyances, with “someone not only different in his customs and 
religion but enemy and unreliable” (Dezcallar 93).  
 
Conclusion  
In how far then can we speak of a continuity or discontinuity of historical prejudice 
regarding Poles and Moroccans respectively, starting from the times of nation-building in 
Germany and Spain to lasting until the present? There are, as I hope I could show in this 
paper, two answers to this question. First, and somewhat at face value, we can state that some 
themes dating from 18th and 19th century Germany and from 15th and 16th century Spain can 
indeed be made out in the focus group discussions, while others cannot.  
In Frankfurt/Oder, the description of the Poles’ dress style is remarkably similar to 
one provided by Forster, the originator of the slogan “die polnische Wirtschaft“, who wrote in 
1843: “Poles are pigs by definition, master and servant alike, they all are poorly dressed, the 
women above all. When adorned, it suits them as the golden necklace suits the swine. There 
are of course exceptions; I speak of the general rule. Expertus loquor.” [“Die Polen sind 
Schweine von Haus aus, so Herren als Diener; alles geht schlecht gekleidet, zumal das 
weibliche Geschlecht; putzen sie sich, so sitzt es wie der Sau das güldene Halsband. 
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Ausnahmen gibt s, das versteht sich; ich spreche von der allgemeinen Regel. Expertus 
loquor“] (Forster 1843, 7).  
Poland is still regarded as a backward country compared to Germany, both in terms of 
its civilisation (“there is nothing going on”, “why should I go to Poland for holiday? I prefer 
going somewhere where it’s better than here”) and in terms of its economic and social 
constitution (“they are so poor that they have to steal and collect other peoples’ garbage”). On 
the other hand, the classical attributes used in relation with Poles in the 19th and 20th centuries 
such as ‘tough’ and ‘courageous’ on the one hand and ‘undisciplined’, ‘inconsistent’ and 
‘unpredictable’ on the other have not come up in the focus groups, neither with the 
adolescents nor with the adults. Rather, the focus groups brought to the fore traditional 
elements of xenophobia that can be variably attributed to any outgroup (“they are dirty”, 
“they make a lot of noise”, “they don’t want to assimilate” [sich anpassen]) and elements 
typical to the border situation (“they steal just about anything”, “they buy so much that 
nothing is left for us”). All in all, the threat posed by the Poles to the Frankfurt students – and 
here they resonate with their teaches and parents - is of economic nature: The Poles might 
take away the Germans’ jobs, the Poles might buy the goods that were foreseen for the 
Germans.  
In Algeciras, the fear of being ‘invaded again’ is as old as the sigh of the last morisco 
who left Grenade in 1492. The students’ image of Moroccans is entirely intertwined with the 
historical figure of the moro or alárabe, the North African Muslim who invaded Spain for 
eight centuries and whom the noble Christian knights had to expel from the Iberian Peninsula 
by force. In the student focus groups, Moroccans are described as uncivilised and cruel, as 
bestial people (“the women betray their husbands”, “the men rape their children”, “the 
children carry guns”). They stand for treason and lies – that come ‘natural’ to them as even 
their Spanish friend claim – for complete unpredictability and for abuse and hassle 
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everywhere they appear, be it drugs, violence or simply noise and smell. Indeed, to the 
adolescents, the Moroccan is the stupid negation of man [estúpida negación del hombre] as 
President Catelar put it (1859). They are all that the proud and correct Christian Spaniard is 
not and therefore pose a cultural threat.  
The description of moros in the Book Called the Anti-Coran written in the mid-16th 
century for “instruction of new converts and for consolation of all committed Christians” is 
still of dangerous actuality today: Alárabes are “barbarous people without law, without king, 
without peace, without breeding, without secure logging, today here, tomorrow there; 
traitorous and stealing people, haunted by the vice of sodomy just like all other moors of 
Africa” (Bernardo Pérez de Chinchón, Libro Llamado Antialcorán; cited in (de Bunes Ibarra 
89).42 Again, incorporated into the anti-Moroccan prejudice are stereotypes typical of any 
formof xenophobia (“if somebody has to deal drugs here, let the Spaniards do it!”, “they act 
like they are the bosses here – it’s the fiesta of Algeciras, not theirs!”) and stereotypes typical 
to borderlands (“a well-dressed Moroccan is a drug dealer”). With both adolescents and 
adults from Alegeciras the feeling of being ‘invaded’ is so profound as to come close to a 
feeling of loss of home, loss of Self. 
The problem however with this first analysis is the following: The students are not 
actually aware of the German-Polish and Spanish-Moroccan history or at least do not make 
reference to it. The question then becomes: How is it possible that the adolescents 
interviewed still represent their neighbours essentially in the same terms as their parents and 
teachers (even if representations are of a different degree of negativity) and that often they 
even use themes that are centuries old? In order to answer this latter question, we recurred to 
the concept of collective memory, or more specifically, to the concept of historical memory 
or memory politics (the ‘flagging’ of certain recollections while ‘un-flagging’ and forgetting 
others). Therefore, only if being ‘not Polish’ is part of the German and ‘being not Moroccan’ 
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part of the Spanish Self-definition we can argue that historical prejudice is absorbed by the 
students through their mere ‘being there’ in everyday life in their particular home countries 
and cities.  
In order to sustain the hypothesis of the national Other we tried to show how both 
Germany and Spain have been able to constitute themselves as nation-states only after having 
subjected their respective neighbours to the East and South to significant territorial loss and 
public defamation. Being German came to mean an orderly way of being (Deutsche 
Tugenden), not leading life like a “Polnische Wirthschaft” (disorganised) nor being subjected 
to it (be it in form of poverty (Polish working classes) or in form of decadence (nobility)). 
Being Spanish came to mean being noble, being Christian and essentially being virile (always 
reliable, tough with enemies, fighting for a just cause). In both cases, the supposed inferiority 
of the Other was used throughout the centuries to elevate the German and Spanish Selves out 
of their various crises. In short, as long as these two dominant nations do not change their 
Self- image, the historical prejudice described in this paper will be continuous by definition. 
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1 The small group discussions (with about 5 participants), loosely following a set topic guide imposed by the 
moderator, were subsequently transcribed verbatim and in local dialect. The aim of these Focus Groups was to 
capture a quasi-natural representation of the “unceasing babble” of everyday communication about “us and 
them”. The comparisons and contrasts constructed around the notions of Selfhood  and Otherness have 
subsequently been content- and discourse-analysed using Liz Spencer’s ‘Framework’ (1994), Laurence Bardin’s 
‘Analyse de Contenu’ (2001) and Ruth Wodak’s ‘discourse-historical approach’ (2001) as a methodological 
framework.  
2 When salience is low, scholar of public opinion would argue, opinions are highly unstable. They are voiced 
somewhat by chance, without sufficient warrant, due to the demands of the situation.  
3 Compare Shell Judendstudie 2001 (see www.shell-jugend2001.de for a summary) for Germany and the report 
Juventud en España 2000 (summarised on www.elpais.es/temas/inmigracion/menua/sociedad.htm: p. 3) for 
Spain). 
4 Developmental psychologists insist that “anti-immigrant sentiments … develop, at the latest, during the first 
half of adolescence and are only slightly modified after that”4 (Noack 2001: 71/72 and 76). 
5 These two types of knowledge – students’ representations of their neighbours and historical conflict and 
prejudice between their own and the neighbouring country – differ epistemologically and operate on different 
levels of analysis: The Focus Groups bring out local knowledge (primary data, highly specific to the context of 
their production) while historical representations aim to capture a broader picture (secondary data, within each 
national setting somewhat overarching time and space). While both are interpretations, derived by ‘double 
hermeneutics’ (Giddens), the latter are scientific generalisations, the former are snap shots of particular 
instances of representations.  
6 Martínez (1994: 5-10) has described four types of borderlands: alienated, wherein tension or animosity 
between neighbouring states or populations prevents cross-border interaction; coexistent, wherein tensions 
between neighbouring states have been reduced, allowing a modest level of cross-border interaction; 
interdependent, wherein populations in neighbouring states interact symbiotically, and wherein some binational 
systems and policies are in place on an interstate or interregional level, yet some policies remain separated by 
the boundary; and, integrated , wherein no barriers exist to interaction or flows across the border, and both states 
and populations on both sides enjoy a high level of mutual trust. 
7 In 1994, 97% of the foreigners legally resident in Germany lived in the Western Länder (Martin 1994: 204). 
While illegal immigration is not a major issue in Germany, undocumented workers are: Unlike most other EU 
member States, Germany legally employs around 250,000 non-EU foreigners, mostly from Central and Eastern 
Europe, under various schemes every year. That is to say, foreigners who entered the country legally (under 
visa-free travel schemes) become illegal when taking up work in the underground economy.  
8 In the period from 1980 to 1995, the number of legally resident foreigners in Spain has increased from 183,000 
with the largest share of them being retirees from Western European and North American to about 500,000, with 
Morocco (75,000 legal residents) being the single largest source country (Comisión Interministerial de 
Extranjería 1995: 24; cited in Calavita 1998: 539-41). On top of that, Spain is one of the EU countries hosting 
the largest number of illegal immigrants: after the regularisation processes culminating in the year 2000 
(allowing some 140,000 ilegales to legalise their situation) there are still about 300.000 illegal immigrants in 
Spain that are extremely important for the functioning of the Spanish economy. 
9 Article 116(1) of the Grundgesetz defined as German all those holding German citizenship as well as the 
German settlers and expellees residing in the German Reich according to the borders of 1937 and their 
descendants. Aussiedler privileges have been retrenched from the introduction of government-assigned places of 
residence, reduction of financial support and fiscal privileges in 1989, to the introduction of a non-official quota 
for the immigration of ethnic Germans and a special reception procedure to be undergone in the countries of 
residence as well as cuts in pension privileges in 1990. “With the realisation of German unity, the ratification of 
the German-Polish border on the basis of international law, and the treaties with the four occupation powers and 
Poland, the post-war period is considered to be over” (Drucksache 12/509 1992; cited in Levy 1999: 178). 
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10 According to (Kosmala 2001, 2:29-33), in the 1990s, per capita investment has been 200 times higher in 
Eastern Germany than in Poland. Eurostat (Cohesion Report 2001) cites a GDP of 32,9 for Lubuskie (Polish 
region bordering with Frankfurt/Oder) and of 70,6 for Brandenburg on the German side.  
11 Far from being a sea-border between Spain and Morocco only, the region on both shores of the Mediterranean 
also includes multiple land-borders: a border between Gibraltar (Great Britain) and Spain in La Línea, borders 
between Morocco and the Spanish enclaves Ceuta (Spanish since 1471) and Melilla (1497) in Northern Africa. 
12 The dictionary (SGEL Gran diccionario de la lengua española, 1996) explains that ‘moro’ has three meanings: 
1. People form Northern Africa, 2. (by extension) Muslim and 3. indigenous people of Malaysia.   
13 “Temido, envidiado, combatido, denostado, el musulmán – sarraceno morisco, turco o marroquí – alimenta 
desde hace diez siglos leyendas y fantasías, motiva cantares y poemas, protaganiza dramas y novelas, estimula 
poderosamente los mecanismos de nuestra imaginación”.  
14 Halbwachs’ seminal work Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire combines the study of the working classes (life 
style, consumption, housing, etc.) with an investigation of memory (on the level of the family, social classes and 
whole societies) as part of a collective psychology. According to Halbwachs, memory or recollection does not 
exist solely on the basis of individual psychological processes; only ‘fragments’ and ‘images’ are kept in 
individual memory. The recollection of personal experiences and collective history on the other hand is 
constituted out of collective representations based on the necessities of the present. 
15 Bartlett was the first to highlight the importance of the social context in storytelling. He found that there is a 
cultural requirement that a story be intelligible both to the teller and to her listeners. This requirement leads to 
distortions, the ‘effort after meaning’. In Bartlett’s ‘experiment’, Cambridge undergraduates were asked to 
serially relay ‘the war of ghosts’, an English translation of a North American Indian folk tale, from one student 
to the next. The Cambridge psychologist then traced the changes (assimilation and accommodation) in 
successive reproductions of the story and thus developed his theory of Remembering.  
16 According to Billig, every nation has to continuously remember itself (and therefore collectively forget certain 
other things about itself). In established nation-states, remembering is infused into everyday activities and 
routines (‘flagging’) by agents that are so numerous and commonplace as to become invisible and unconscious. 
Banal Nationalism therefore denotes the nationalism taking place at the centre, everyday, among us (rather than 
with ‘them’). 
17 The idea that past experience is somehow inscribed into a ‘trace’ in the individual’s mind that ‘represents’ the 
experience or carries information about it, is at the heart of ‘representative’ or ‘indirect’ realism in the 
philosophy of memory. Indirect Realism is now the dominant view of memory, rejecting the claim that memory 
is an immediate knowledge of something past (direct realism). The concept of representation underlies not only 
modern philosophy of mind but also much work in cognitive science but has, ever since Wittgenstein (1980, 
paragraph 220) been attacked on three grounds: How is the content  of memory representations determined? 
How can traces provide the right causal connections between past and present if they are not static and 
permanent inner items?   
18 “If we were to examine the way in which we remember, we would recognize that most of our memories come 
back to us when our family, our friends, or other people recall them to us […] it is in society that man acquires 
his memories, that he recalls them, that he recognizes them, and that he locates them. […] I do not need to seek 
out where the memories are, where they are kept, in my brain, or in some corner of my mind to which only I 
would have access, because they are recalled to me from outside, and because the groups to which I belong 
continuously offer me the means to reconstruct them” (Halbwachs 1925). Memories depend upon the present as 
it is feelings of belonging and interaction situations here and now that call out for collective memories and 
representations in order to ‘make meaning’. For example, Halbwachs relates the story of Charles Blondel who, 
as a child fell into a water hole and risked drowning. He was scared because he thought he might be punished by 
his parents, or, alternatively, disappear and cause them much grief. According to Halbwachs, if Blondel 
remembers this event, it is because today he is still the child of his parents.   
19 In Germany: Unemployment, perspectives after school. Poles: shopping habits, cigarette trade, theft, (no) 
differences between Poles and Russians. Turks: Berlin, sexism. Asians, Blacks, asylum seekers: little relevance. 
Holidays in foreign countries and differences encountered, whether one feels ‘European’. The border and EU 
Enlargement. 
In Spain: The border in Algeciras and Gibraltar. Perspectives after school & the (un)willingness to travel. 
Moros: drug traffic, differences between people from Ceuta and Morocco, sexism, unwillingness to adapt, 
(dis)honesty, dress-style. Black Africans: work ethic, friendliness. Gitanos: theft. Reciprocity Spain-Morocco. 
Muslims and Catholics. 
20 With the exception of two children who have relatives in or from Poland [„Also, weil mein Vater, der, also 
mein Vater, der kommt auch aus Polen, also wurde in Polen geboren, also in Oberschlesien. Das wurde dann 
irgendwann mal zu Polen gemacht, das war ja früher mal Deutschland.“ (D5-M3, p.1)], no references to history 
were made in any of the student focus groups. 
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21 While there was some form of coercion in sampling for the students (almost entire class groups took part), 
there is a clear sampling bias with parents and teachers since only volunteers participated. Right-wing extremists 
or parents or teachers with a truly negative representations of Poles and Moroccans would obviously never 
participate in a debate led by a researcher from an institution labelled European University Institute.   
22 “Man muß ... zugeben, daß das deutsche Volk von allen Völkern Europas dem polnischen am ablehnendsten 
gegenübersteht. Es könnte fast so scheinen, als wenn als Rest der Kriegspsychose das Bedürfnis übriggeblieben 
wäre, irgendeinen Feind zum Hassen zu haben“ (Hellmut von Gerlach 1930, zitiert nach Helbig 1989).    
23 Note that this discourse is almost cliché by now. It is widely documented in the literature, e.g. “Until a few 
years ago, ‘el moro’ … in Spain simply referred to immigrants from other countries, to the passenger who 
during the summer months crossed the Peninsula from top to bottom, from the Pyrenees to Algeciras, in order to 
spend his holidays in his country and return back to his different European destinations”. [“Hasta hace pocos 
años en España el moro ... era el inmigrante de otros países, el transeúnte que en los meses de verano 
attravesaba la Península de cabo a rabo, desde los Pirineos hasta Algeciras, para pasar sus vacaciones en su 
tierra y retornar de nuevo a sus diferentes destinos europeos”] (López García 93a).  
24 “During the past centuries, civilisation has followed its natural path from West to East and therefore provided 
the Germans with a status superior to that of Poles, the Poles with a status superior to Russians, the Russians 
with superiority over Tartars” (Binder, my translation). 
25 With the conquest/purchase of Pommerellen in 1309, the German Knights took already Christianised land 
which undermined their ‘Christianising-missionary’ role. 
26 “Mitte der 1830er Jahre waren somit in Deutschland zwei gegensätzliche Grundmeinungen über Polen und 
die Polen ausgebildet, die sich zu Stereotypen verfestigten und sich im Kern bis in die Gegenwart gehalten 
haben: Einerseits gilt Polen als ein zivilisatorisch, von seiner Wirtschafts - und Sozialverfassung her 
rückständiges Land. Seiner Bevölkerung werden zwar Attribute wie „tapfer“, „mutig“, ja „heldenhaft“ aber auch 
solche wie „disziplinlos“, „sprunghaft“ und „unberechenbar“ zugeschrieben. Im Ergebnis ist Polen kaum in der 
Lage, sich politisch und wirtschaftlich effizient zu organisieren und hat gewissermaßen zwangläufig seine 
Staatlichkeit verloren. ... Andererseits geben die Polen Anlaß zur Bewunderung aufgrund ihrer Freiheitsliebe, 
ihres Eintretens für eine gerechte Sache, ihres Muts, sich auch Stärkeren entgegenzustellen, und des Willens 
ihrer politischen Führer nach fortschrittlichen Veränderungen, worin vor allem Teile des deutschen Bürgertums 
eigene Zielsetzungen erkennen. Zum Stereotyp der Polen zählt ferner ihre enge Verbundenheit mit der 
katholischen Kirche, was im überwiegend protestantischen Deutschland eher ambivalent bewertet wird, sowie 
die „schöne Polin“, die gleichfalls patriotisch gesinnt ist.“      
27 See for instance Goethe’s essay “Proposal for the instauration of the German language in Poland” [Vorschlag 
zur Einfuehrung der deutschen Sprache in Polen], published by J.P. Eckermann in 1892 with the subtitle „in 
order to increase the culture of the lower classes“ [um eine hoehere Cultur der niederen Classen zu bewirken].   
28See for example Gustav Freytag’s novel Soll und Haben (1855). 
29“Der Gegensatz der Namen Polen und Deutsche [wird] seinen Vereinigungspunkt ... in dem Namen Preußen 
finden“ 
30Wide-ranging legislative provisions were made to support von Virchow’s “Kulturkampf” (from 1871) – an 
attempt to undermine the influence of the Catholic Church in Germany that took strong anti-Polish tendencies in 
the Eastern provinces of the newly-founded Reich – as well as the Ostmarkenverein (from 1894) – aiming to 
‘germanise’ East-Prussia and Pomerania. Around the turn of the century, additional legislations was passed to 
undermine the use of the Polish language (Vereinsgesetz 1908), to support Germanness [“Förderung des 
Deutschtums“] (Beamtenerlass of 1989, Feuerstättengesetz 1904), to hinder the expansion of Polish farms 
(1904) and finally to annex Polish property (Enteignungsgesetz 1907).   
31 “Ever since the Arabic invasion, the horizon of Spanish life is dominated … by the opposition between 
Christians and Moors; the Other is both Muslim and foreign. The Self then is both Christian and Spanish”.   
32 According to Ridao, this division was necessary in order to justify the colonial enterprise in Morocco since 
1912: « La croisade coloniale peut se résumer à cette dramatique dualité: ou elle renonçait à la totalité de 
l’héritage andalou et en même temps a certains titres de gloire nationaliste comme l’influence d’Averroès sur la 
Renaissance, ou elle assumait totalement cet héritage en sachant que le faire sien revenait à rogner les 
fondements même de l’aventure coloniale. La solution suggérée par l’historiographie et plus concrètement par 
l’arabisme fut d’une certaine façon un jugement de Salomon. Etant donné que les ambitions coloniales de 
l’Espagne se limitaient au Maghreb; il suffisait alors de diviser al-Andalus en deux périodes différenciées, l’une 
prospère et florissante, l’autre décadente et presque monstrueuse. » (Ridao 2000:30-31). 
33 It is important to remember that during this period almost all of Spain, in the almost absence of coercion, 
converted to Islam. The Muslim population of al-Andalus was therefore not composed of Arabic invaders and 
their descendants but rather of generations of Muwallad  [Spaniards converted to Islam]. According to Dezcallar, 
prose of the time such as the Cantar de Mío Cid demonstrates that both the Mozarabes [Christians under Muslim 
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rule], and the Muwallad lived in al-Andalus “without losing their radical Spanishness” [sin perder su 
españolidad radical] (Dezcallar 93) which to him seems to mean mutual trading and bonding. 
34El espíritu de la cruzada y “el ideal de reconquista como eliminación violenta de los musulmanes de las tierras 
de España” se desarrolló como reacción a la “intolerancia primaria e intransigente de los almorávides” y a la 
potencia “militar avasalladora de los almohades”.    
35According to Vives, Europe “that was following the same track in the mystical undertaking of recuperating 
Holy Places, did not only not hinder Spanish Christendom but even gave further breath to their aspirations” 
(Vives 70). [Europa, “llevada por la misma vía en el empeño místico de rescatar los Santos Lugares, no sólo no 
detiene a la Cristiandad hispánica, sino que la alienta en sus aspiraciones”.]   
36“Fue a finales del siglo XV, después de la conquista de Granada, cuando, en apoyo de la nueva política 
instaurada por los Reyes Católicos, se recrea la imagen del moro como enemigo tradicional colectiva del pueblo 
español”. Another commentators also suggests that all “eight centuries of conviviality” were characterised by “a 
common space en the cultural domain and, to a large extent, also in the social, economic and even political 
sphere” and a great “valorisation, by Christian Spain, of the high degree of development of the Arabic 
civilisation” (López García 93b). [Ocho siglos de convivencica ... definiendo todo un espacio común en los 
dominios cultural y, en gran medida, social, económico y hasta político” [y de] “valoración de alto grado de 
desarrollo de la civilización arábiga por la España cristiana”.]    
37“La explusión fue una gran concesión a un racismo social, colectivo, que buscaba paliar con sus chivos 
expiatorios la gran crisis interior”.   
38 “Durante siglos, la larga lucha por la “Reconquista” y el episodio final de la expulsión de los moros ha 
consolidado, para los españoles, la voluntad de borrar toda relación, toda referencia a una cultura y a una 
civilisación cuya riqueza y brillo hubieran debido, por el contrario, suscitar en Europa un interés sostenido”.  
39 While the war secured the Spaniards’ access to the Strait of Gibraltar, no significant territorial gains were 
made. The Spanish-Moroccan war of 1859/60 has been evaluated as the last rampart of the crusades, a means to 
“rise Spain out of its frustration”. 
40 Northern Africa had been colonised by Spain for strategic/defence, commercial and civilisatory reasons since 
the late 15th century (think of e.g. Ceuta, Melilla, Djerba, Oran …) but it was only after the loss of most of its 
Empire in the beginning of the 19th century and when France started colonising Algeria, that Spain’s interest in 
Morocco reawakened.  
41 “La etapa colonial de España en Africa deja en el subconsciente colectivo del español la consciencia de un 
riesgo vago y difuso que viene del Sur. A partir de ahora Marruecos se asocia en la mente del español de la calle 
con enemigo y con un peligro que procede de Africa del Norte, cruza el Estrecho y puede alcanzarnos a todos”. 
42 “Gente bárbara sin ley, sin rey, sin paz, sin crianca, sin assiento cierto, oy aqui mañana alli; gente traydora y 
ladrona, untada del vicio de sodomia como todos los más mo ros de Africa lo son”; libro escrito para la 
“instrucción de los nuevamente convertidos y para la consolación de todo fiel Christiano”.   
ANNEX 1: Sequences from Focus Groups in Original Language 
Sequence 1 - Germany: D5-M10 
M10: [...] irgendwie hab ick n schlechtet Bild von denen, weil, also wenn man halt immer nur sone Leute 
bejegnet, die weiss ich immer, wees ick, so nen komischen Karren ziehen oder wees ick, irgendwelche Kippen 
verkofen, dat is doch oock irgendwie garkeen Bild für son Land, irgendwie. Deswegen hat man so nen 
komischen schlechten Eindruck, irgendwie. – Ja, wees nich, irgendwie ... hab ick mal so jehört, in Slubice soll 
das eigentlich das einzig Dumme so sein, also wees nick, sonst in Polen, also so dahinter, da soll dat eijentlick 
janz o.k. sein, irgendwie.  
T: Und warst du da schon mal gewesen? 
M10: Ne, ne. Aber ick hab das halt so jehört. Also, wees ook nich. … 
 
Sequence 2 - Germany: D8-l.450  
F49: … die Polen einfach so, wees ick nich, dreckig rumlaufen, so. Also ebent halt, ebent halt, wie sie schon 
sachte, ebent halt keene moderen Sachen anhaben, oder wie wir, ebent halt hier so. Wat ebent halt in is, sag ich 
jetzt mal so. Und det sieht ebent halt meistens ooch halt ... ooch halt, dass die ebent halt ooch wie jesacht, 
dreckig rumlaufen. Dass die Klamotten dreckig sind und so.  
F31: Mh, und wenn die Frauen in die Stadt gehen ... 
F49: Jaa! 
F31: denn sind se immer so richtig feinjemacht, so, also denn tun se immer so ... wie ooch kuck ma, ich bin 
schick, und denn sehen se immer aus wie feinjemachte Assis irjendwie. 
F49: Mh. 
F31: So Mühe geben, aber trotzdem nicht geschafft. 
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Sequence 3  - Germany: D2.l.337-345 
F2: Immer kastenweise, find ich, also palettenweise [kaufen sie ein]. 
M2 : Also, wenn se eenkoofen, denn kofen se richtig doll wat een. Wirklich, dat is, hinten is dat, da is, der 
hintere Teil vom Auto sieht ... 
F2: Die können nich mal durch die Scheibe gucken. Richtig dick zujedrückt, sieht aus wie ... zu kriegen is. 
Richtig schlimm. – Na, ick wohn ja nu hinten, da is auch n Aldi, da siehst nur schwarze Schilder. 
M2: Naja. 
 
Sequence 4 - Germany: D2.l.716-720 
M 2 : Det is halt bei den Polen so, die  … Normalerweise kaufste viele verschiedene Sachen in geringem Masse. 
Polen ... haben ... ähem, wenig Sachen, die se einkofen, aber ... also, wenig verschiedene Sachen, aber .... 
F2: Massenweise.  
M2: Massenweise. 
 
Sequence 5 - Germany: D8-F31-l.550 
F31: Weil ick meen für die isset denn ja vielleicht doch noch janz jutet Zeug, also ... weil jetzt son ollet Fahrrad 
was wir so, wo wir uns nich mehr ruffsetzen würden, dat hat für die denn noch wat jutet, so unjefähr. Also ... 
weil ich ebent, weil ich ebent der Meinung bin, dass die ähem, also ich bezieh dat jetzt immer so auf Slubice, 
weil ich kenn halt die andere Seite von Polen nicht so wirklich. Jedenfalls denk ich mal, haben die nicht wirklich 
so nen hohen Lebensstandard wie wir, also die, die sind halt mit weniger zufrieden als wir. Mit weniger und 
nicht so guten Sachen, und bei uns muß dat allet n bisschen besser und toller sein.  
 
Sequence 6 – Germany: Parents 
“Als es noch die DDR gab, gab es sogenannte ... also, tschechischer Jugendverband - FDJ, also DDR-
Jugendverband, Polen-DDR, ... alle möglichen Sachen. Und, das war, also ich sach’s denn mal: Das war ja 
vorjejeben (...) da wurde einfach vom Zentralrat festjelegt, dann und dann ist ein Treffen, FDJ und polnischer 
Jugendverband ... ZSNP hießen die. So, und dann wußten die, wenn denn FDJ waren, also einmal war ich auch 
dabei, da war’s hier in Frankfurt, mit welchen aus Angermünde, da hab ich auch mal jearbeitet. Und die wurden 
da alle so ranjekarrt, sach ich jetzt mal, und dann war da ne Veranstaltung. Und diese (!) jungen Leute sind nicht 
alle mit Begeisterung zu so nem Treffen jefahren. Das muß man sagen. Die sind alle heute erwachsen. [...] Oder 
wenn man jetzt in irgendwelchen Läden war, Fleischer sag ich jetzt mal, da sind eben polnische Bürgerinnen 
gekommen, haben dann wees ich zehn so ne langen Flachwürste jekoft, sind dann nach Berlin jefahren auf’n 
Markt und haben sie verkoft. Und das sind alles Dinge, die hängen bleiben. Also, ich hab’s ja damals nur jehört, 
ich hab’s ja nicht selber erlebt. Oder: Unsere Bürger sind beschimpft worden, von polnischen Bürgern, die dann 
im dutzend Schuhe einjekoft haben, und und und. Das war schon früher. Also, das ist jetzt nicht ... weil: Wende, 
weil wir jetzt... das war schon immer! Das sind Leute, die heute erwachsen sind und die wieder Kinder haben. 
Und das ... das ist das, was F1 meint. Es setzt sich dann irgendwas fort.“  
 
Sequence 7 – Spain: E4 – F118-M119 
F118: Al-Andalus. Andalucía proviene de eso; cuando estuvieron aquí los moros 
T: Y cuándo era eso? 
F118: Hace 300 años que se fueron. 
M119: Pero están viniendo otra vez 
F118: En verdad esto es más de ellos que nuestro; ellos se han pegao aquí 600 años o más pero a mí me da igual. 
F115: Me da igual también. 
T: ¿Cuándo dijiste fue eso? 
F118: Hace 300 años. 
F115: 300 antes de Cristo. 
T: ¿Por qué han venido, qué han hecho aquí? 
F115: Construir cosas; tenemos ruinas en el parque MªCristina, aquí enfrente. 
F118: La Mezquita de Córdoba, la Alhambra ... 
F115: Hicieron cosas muy bonitas. 
M119: Pero los moros son basura. 
T: ¿Los de hoy en día o los de antes? 
M119: Todos. 
 
Sequence 8 – Spain: E4, l.589-616 
M119: [...si ayudas a los ilegales al llegar a España] te da un buen dinerito porque tienen dinero de la droga; es 
como una cadena hata que se quedan co Epaña. 
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T: ¿Qué van a hacer con España? 
M119: Se van a quedar con España y no va a echar a todó, antes los mato a todó. 
F118: Y eso no es sólo Marruecos, se juntan todo lo moro de too lo lao. 
M119: Yo meto una bomba. 
M120: Me tienen que matar. 
T: ¿España va a ser mora algún día? 
M120: Tengo que estar yo muerto.  
M119: Algún día se revelarán contra nosotro y nos querrán echar de aquí y habrá una guerra, pero la fuer ... la 
unión hace la fuerza, nosotro somo má que ello. 
F118: Si siguen llegando cada día míl moro ... 
M120: En Ceuta hay una barriada que los niños con 8 años tienen moto, coche, 9 o 10 años pistolas. Hace un 
mes se escapó un tigre y se ha comio a una mujer, en es barriada hacen lo que les da la gana, no entra la polizia. 
 
Sequence 9 – Spain: E4-13 
F118: ...es que las moras son muy traicioneras 
F114: Algunas; otras no 
F118: Saben mucho; se casan con un hombre mayor que se va a morir, le arregla los papeles y como las las 
moras saben mucho como agarrar a un tío, el hombre se encapricha con ella, le mete dos o tres me tres meneos 
(risas) y lo deja en el sitio y ya ella como tiene los papeles arreglaos y tiene la vida res resuelta; después coje se 
va con otro marroquí y ya está. 
F115: Se vienen embarazás aquí pa parí aquí; y cuando tienen el niño se tienen que quedá aquí porque el niño es 
español 
F118: Tragan bolas que revientan... 
 
Sequence 10 – Spain: Parent Group 
A.- [...] Vamos es que aquí hemos tenido 40 años de... de que  aquí los buenos eran los católicos y los moros 
eran mu, mu, mu malos. o sea y aquí la Reconquista, es que hay que entendernos también nosotros la cultura 
que hemos tenido y lo que hemos aprendido, por ejemplo lo del AL-Andalus, tal y como se entiende ahora y 
bueno la, la  ,las cosa que se están planteando desde la Junta de Andalucía que es la discusión de Al- Andalus, 
pues eso no existía hasta hace cuatro días,¿eh? que antes no se conocía eso... nos enseñaron la, la ,la Historia de 
la invasión de los moros y después los echamos a los no sé cuantos siglos vinieron los Reyes Católicos y se 
llevaron a los moros igual que nos, nos , nos cepillamos a tos los judíos vamos. A todos los judíos que los 
echamos, pues iguà. 
E.- Actualmente nosotros reconocemos, esa.... cultura árabe que tuvimos aquí, yo creo que la amamos incluso, 
porque fue una mezcla enriquecedora, por lo menos para, para 
A.- Pa Andalucía. 
 
Sequence 11 – Spain: Teacher Group 
“Antes no nos preocupaban los moros nada más que en el mes de Julio y del mes de Agosto, que nos invadían. 
Algeciras, pero ahora tu oyes, en cualquier sitio en Algecrias, ahora se oye “nos estan invadiendo los moros”, 
“cada vez tenemos más”. [...] a este señor, a este Luis X, justo enfrente le han metido una gardaza y justo al lao 
tiene una mezquita, y él, como no sabía ya lo que hacer, porque se siente totalmente invadido ... ha plantificao 
un retrato del Sagrado Corazón de Jesús en la puerta” 
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ANNEX 2: The Political-Legal Context at the Two Borders  
 
 Germany-Poland  Spain-Morocco 
European Affairs  “Poland’s attorney in Europe” or 
“Interessengemeinschaft” 
(community of interests, e.g. in terms of 
EU) 
“política de cloroformo” (lobbying for 
financial aid to Morocco, foreign 
investment)   
Barcelona Process  
Diplomatic Relations Historic tensions (colonisation of the 
East vs. expansionist ‘eastward strive’, 
war crimes and expulsion, treaty of 
Potsdam and border issues; 2001/2: 
transition period for free movement)  
Historic tensions (‘Mooris h invasion’ vs. 
colonisation of Morocco, Sahara, Ceuta & 
Melilla, the Strait of Gibraltar, fisheries); 
2001/2002: the isle of Perejil/Leila)  
Economy  Germany – most important trading 
partner of Poland; asymmetry  
Spain – 2nd most important trading partner 
of Spain; asymmetry 
Border Crossing Visa-free travel for Poles into Germany 
(since 8.4.1991) and Germans into 
Poland (since 1.1.1991); from 1.7.2003 
visa needed for CEE citizens for travel 
into Poland  
Travel visa conditioned on letter of 
invitation/hotel booking/student ID, 
return-ticket, medical certificate, and 
‘sufficient means’ for subsistence in 
Spain; also ‘transit visa’ (valid less than 
five days)    
Residence Permits “posted-worker” agreements (cross-
border provision of services)  
“posted-worker” agreement (2003), 
‘Regimen Comunitario’ and ‘Regimen 
General’: temporary residence permit and 
work permit (1 year, renewable up to 4 
times), permanent residence permit (after 
5 years of legal residence without ‘gaps’ 
in documents) 
Naturalisation  After 8 years of residence (+ acceptance 
of the law, employment, knowledge of 
German) 
After 6 years of continuous legal status 
(+loyalty to the constitution, employment, 
knowledge of Spanish) 
Second Generation Provisional jus solis citizenship, choice 
of citizenship at the age of 23 (no dual 
nationality)  
Automatic jus solis citizenship (?), dual 
nationality possible 
Immigration Policy 
 
 
 
 
New law based on quotas; lenient 
asylum policy 
‘Cupo’ (cap); lenient asylum policy 
Illegal Immigrants Not an issue, but undocumented workers  ~300,000 in Spain 
Public Opinion towards 
immigration 
(Eurobarometer) 
Among the least favourite in EU Most favourite in EU 
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